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James Longenbach’s previous book of criticism, Modern Poetry
after Modernism (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997), opens by reworking
Randall Jarrell’s claim in the essay "The End of the Line" that
"Romantic poetry holds in solution contradictory tendencies which,
isolated and exaggerated in modernism, look startlingly opposed to
each other and to the earlier stages of romanticism." Replacing the references to romanticism with modernism, and the reference to modernism with postmodernism, Longenbach begins his argument against
the continued use of the "breakthrough narrative," a faulty critical
construct based on an overly simple idea of a too-easy distinction
between modernism and postmodernism, suggesting instead that we
should think of postmodernism less as a break from modernism and
more a continuation of modernism by other means.
While Modern Poetry after Modernism is an interesting and insightful
book, it is also highly problematic. As has been argued elsewhere
("Some Thoughts on ‘A Mind Thinking,’" The Iowa Review, 32.2), in that
book, Longenbach establishes his own faulty critical construct, suggesting that much postmodern poetry should be considered the poetry of "a mind thinking." Perhaps too enchanted by the phrase "a mind
thinking," Longenbach applies the phrase to, in hopes of actually
describing, the work of various postmodern writers, such as Randall
Jarrell, John Ashbery, Jorie Graham, and Robert Pinsky. However, the
only way the phrase "a mind thinking" can really connect such different writers is if it actually serves to cover up the fact that, when they
do in fact think in their writing, these writers often think in very different ways about very different things. Far from joining poets, considering their minds thinking largely differentiates them.
Though it seems to mostly try to join poets, Longenbach’s work
does differentiate some poets, but in a disappointingly traditional way:
Modern Poetry after Modernism almost completely excludes discussion of
Language poetry. The result of this odd exclusion—odd, since if any
one group is writing modern poetry after modernism it is the
Language poets—is that Longenbach’s book, which hopes to develop
a better, more accurate picture of postmodern American poetry in
order to avoid what Longenbach calls "the next inevitable [critical]
backlash," ends up reinforcing old divisions and maintaining mainstream value judgments.
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Although The Resistance to Poetry (University of Chicago Press,
2004), Longenbach’s new book of criticism, again offers some interesting insights and makes some subtle connections among various
poems, it is largely the isolation and exaggeration of problematic features of Modern Poetry after Modernism. In The Resistance to Poetry,
Longenbach largely tries to give substance to the catchphrase, "a mind
thinking"; however, Longenbach’s descriptions and definitions of the
poetry of "a mind thinking" turn out to be disappointingly repetitive
and reactionary, yet another conservative reinforcement of outmoded
distinctions and evaluations. To the extent that The Resistance to Poetry
marks any kind of advance in Longenbach’s thinking since Modern
Poetry after Modernism, it is as a massive critique of his own thinking;
examined closely, The Resistance to Poetry makes clear that Longenbach
should, and does, know better than to make the arguments he does.
Longenbach’s tutelary spirit in The Resistance to Poetry is, again,
Jarrell, though this time the quotation Longenbach, without acknowledgment, will base his thinking on is from Jarrell’s essay, "The
Obscurity of the Poet":
How our poetry got this way [too difficult]—how romanticism was purified and exaggerated and "corrected" into modernism; how poets carried
all possible tendencies to their limits, with more than scientific zeal; how
the dramatic monologue, which once had depended for its effect upon
being a departure from the norm of poetry, now became in one form or
another the norm…—is one of the most complicated and interesting of
stories.

Explicitly, Longenbach’s book, a collection of nine belletristic essays
on a variety of topics, from line to disjunction to voice, is a defense of
the obscurity of the poet, suggesting that the difficulty of poetry, so
often complained about, actually is the source of poetry’s strength.
Longenbach states, "[T]he marginality of poetry is in many ways the
source of its power, a power contingent on poetry’s capacity to resist
itself more strenuously than it is resisted by the culture at large."
However, the book’s implicit thesis is that poetry may be obscure as
long as it seems a dramatic enactment of "a mind thinking." In a chapter called "The Other Hand," a chapter that includes some discussion
of Hamlet’s "To be, or not to be" soliloquy, the locus classicus for
thinking about the dramatic monologue, Longenbach is consistently
interested in poetry that he thinks creates "the sound of thinking in
poetry—not the sound of finished thought but the sound of a mind
alive in the syntactical process of discovering what it might be thinkP L E I A D E S —124

ing.” Additionally, Longenbach values a portion of a poem for the way
its lines "dramatize the process of a mind discovering that what it sees
is the product of what it thinks," and he wants to see in poems "the
temporal process of transformation, the visceral process of thought."
Longenbach so greatly prizes the poem of a mind thinking that
he subordinates the value of every other aspect of poetry to its ability to produce the effect of thinking. For example, in the chapter "The
End of the Line," a discussion of the poetic line, Longenbach notes
that while he has "for strategic purposes examined different poems
that highlight different kinds of lines egregiously (end-stopped, parsing, annotating)," he explains that "the point is that most free verse
cannot afford to confine itself to any one of these procedures," for
lines of whatever kind, of all kinds, must be used to create "drama,"
to determine "our experience of a poem’s temporal unfolding." In the
chapter "The Spokenness of Poetry," Longenbach goes so far as to
suggest that we can and should use the drama of "a mind thinking" to
create a new tradition in poetry. Citing Robert Frost’s dictum that
"Everything written is as good as it is dramatic," and recognizing how
this idea becomes analytical method in New Criticism which "take[s]
for granted that all poetry involves a dramatic organization,"
Longenbach states, "The method leads us to prefer modern poems
that announce themselves immediately as voice driven…and encourages us to look back at older poems that prefigure the preference…."
This tradition holds significant value for Longenbach. As
opposed to poetry that Longenbach considers too easily utilitarian or
didactic, descriptions Longenbach always employs contemptuously,
and in fact does not want to talk about—in the opening paragraphs of
his book, Longenbach makes clear that the poems he will discuss are
not those of "epic narrative," or, in other words, "poems aspiring to a
great deal of cultural weight"—Longenbach wants poetry with an
almost mystical existential import. Citing Elizabeth Bishop, who states,
"What one seems to want in art, in experiencing it…is the same thing
that is necessary for its creation, a self-forgetful, perfectly useless concentration," Longenbach states that engaging with art is "a way of
being alive," that the sense of uselessness art provides is, like dreaming or falling in love, "a freedom to forget ourselves so that we might
discover we are different from ourselves." Elsewhere, Longenbach
states that "great poems" don’t "reflect our importance" but rather
their language "returns our attention not to confirm what we know
but to suggest that we might be different from ourselves," and, further,
that "[r]ather than asking to be justified, poems ask us to exist."
Although Longenbach makes brief reference to Robert
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Langbaum’s important work, The Poetry of Experience: The Dramatic
Monologue in Modern Literary Tradition—a book that takes up the work
Jarrell describes in "The Obscurity of the Poet," attempting to account
for the rise of the dramatic monologue, and that in fact cites the Jarrell
quote about the dramatic monologue—Longenbach’s connections to
that work are much deeper than his brief mention would suggest.
Many of Longenbach’s key ideas parallel and even echo Langbaum’s.
According to Langbaum, the rise of the dramatic monologue occurred
as a result of falling away from oversimplified pre-Enlightenment
notions of an all-too-easy split between perceiver and perceived,
between knower and known. The dramatic monologue, in which "an
observer moves through a series of intellectual oscillations toward a
purpose of which he is himself at each point not aware," arose then
because one could not write in a post-Enlightenment world a poem
that could confidently connect sure sententiae about the way the world
really is. Rather, the poem could show and—in order to be honest
about the new rifts appearing between self and world, and to save significant freedom for the self in a new, Newtonian world of iron-clad,
chain-link cause-and-effect—really had to show the mind as an active
agent in the world, participating in the making of meaning. Langbaum
is absolutely clear on these points. In a formula Langbaum repeats in
various ways throughout his book, the dramatic monologue, "the new
kind of lyric in which the poet discovers his idea through a dialectical
interchange with the external world," is new in that it is not "the traditional lyric in which the poet sets forth his already formulated idea
either epigrammatically or logically…." And this new kind of poem
has a new kind of significance. It doesn’t teach lessons; its importance
is "existential rather than moral." According to Langbaum, dramatic
monologues "…all mean the same thing—the greatest possible surge
of life."
Unlike Longenbach, though, Langbaum does not suggest a tradition but very much works with a tradition, making a meaning for the
canonical tradition of the dramatic monologue that might help readers to see that tradition in new ways. Responding to one critic, who
says of Robert Browning’s dramatic monologue, "Childe Roland to
the Dark Tower Came," that it is just too disconnected, too "dreamlike and…disjointed," that it lacks "a definite moral," and so seems "a
simple work of fancy, built up of picturesque impressions which have,
separately or collectively, produced themselves in the author’s mind,"
Langbaum states, rightly, that now, after familiarizing oneself with his
insights, one can read the poem with the "advantage" of his work’s
"particular context," noting that "it is one thing to dismiss the poem
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as simply an experience, and another to apply to it the systematic concept of a poetry of experience—to find through a comparison of it
with other dramatic monologues…that it has a rationale in its irrationality and an order in its disorder."
Though Langbaum’s adherence to a preestablished canon might
seem a bit conservative, in actuality it is more liberal and critical than
Longenbach’s subtly, though ultimately extremely, conservative work.
Langbaum employs his work to create new critical distinctions; for
example, he uses his insights to critique canonical authors. Langbaum
recognizes, for example, that Wordsworth’s "Resolution and
Independence" and Keats’s "Ode on a Grecian Urn" are dramatizations of experiences while "Ode to Duty" and "Ode on Melancholy"
are not. Thus, he clearly recognizes that individual poets, even great
poets, often work in different modes, and are capable of succeeding or
not at making a poem comparable to that of "a mind thinking."
Longenbach, however, is unable or unwilling to make such judgments
and evaluations of individual poets and especially established, "great"
poets—even though Longenbach’s work, unlike Langbaum’s, demands
such evaluations.
Longenbach’s relationship with a canon should be much more
involved than Langbaum’s because unlike Langbaum’s work, which is
largely descriptive, Longenbach’s work is, in large part, prescriptive.
Citing Jarrell, who states, in "The End of the Line," "Today, for the
poet, there is an embarrassment of choices: poets can choose—do
choose—to write anything from surrealism to imitations of Robert
Bridges" and Auden, who states that in order to honor the "subjective
life," we "must accept strange juxtapositions of imagery, singular associations of ideas,” Longenbach knows that today a poet can do anything she wants with her poetry. And yet, agreeing with Auden who
states elsewhere that the danger of such disjunction is the confusion
of "authentic non-logical relations which arouse wonder with accidental ones which arouse mere surprise and in the end fatigue,"
Longenbach does believe some poetry is better than others. Thus,
Longenbach must argue which poems seduce properly or, to borrow
a phrase from Wallace Stevens that Longenbach borrows, which
poems resist the intelligence almost successfully rather than too successfully. Thus, Longenbach should have to establish a canon, a tradition. He should have to say what poems by Language poets such as
Bob Perelman and Lyn Hejinian are in the tradition. He should have
to say what poems by somewhat lesser-known poets, such as J.H.
Prynne and Frederick Seidel, are in. He should have to say what poems
by younger poets, such as Mark Levine, Claudia Rankine, D.A. Powell,
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Joshua Clover, Jeff Clark, Jennifer Moxley, Spenser Short, Chelsey
Minnis, Matt Rohrer, Olena Kalytiak Davis, poets who seem very
interested in synthesizing Language techniques and confessional ends,
are in and which others seem "a simple work of fancy, built up of picturesque impressions…produced …in the author’s mind."
But he doesn’t, and instead of establishing a tradition,
Longenbach actually falls back on a distinction he himself argues is
bogus: the distinction between Language poetry and more mainstream
poetry. This is clear in Longenbach’s work on disjunction. In the chapter "Forms of Disjunction," Longenbach recognizes two forms of
disjunction: dry and wet. While there are a few moments in the chapter when Longenbach allows that there is some overlap between the
two forms of disjunction, that each may have some benefits, it is clear
that dry disjunction—a Poundian disjunction with a "didactic imperative" that is practiced by a poet like Rosemarie Waldrop (30-1)—is bad,
and wet disjunction—an Eliotic disjunction practiced by poets like
Jorie Graham, John Ashbery, and John Koethe that evokes "a rivetingly engaged act of speaking" and, thus, can exude the existential
power necessary to "take us to different places at the same time" and
to leave us "feeling that we occupy different registers of consciousness
at the same time"—is good.
Making such a distinction, though, is farcical; it states only that
poetry in the Pound tradition—read: Language poetry—is bad, while
other work is good. Such an assessment, though always contestable, is
hardly new. And yet Longenbach keeps making this unnecessary distinction and assessment even though he himself wants to be rid of it.
Particularly telling and disappointing is that even when he hopes to
show that there is no significant difference between Language poetry
and other traditions and schools, Longenbach inevitably ends up valorizing the non-Language poetry. The chapter "Song and Story," for
example, begins with extended quotations from two of Language poet
Charles Bernstein’s poems—one that is problematically "all story" and
another that is problematically "all song"—but ends by allowing Ellen
Bryant Voigt, a poet who is definitely in the Eliotic line—her poem
under discussion opens with a line that, according to Longenbach,
"dramatiz[es] the…process of recording experience"—to occupy the
space of Language poetry as she is one who "would agree with
Bernstein that no good poem allows words to become transparent"
rather than examining any other Bernstein poem, even though
Longenbach notes that "most of Bernstein’s poems dwell in a middle
ground where the semantic power of language is alternately bolstered
and resisted by the physical seduction of sound…."
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The reconfiguration of the space of Language poetry is generally an important endeavor; the distinction between Language poetry
and the mainstream, the distinction between what Bernstein calls antiabsorptive, or disruptive, writing and absorptive, or transparent, writing is faulty, and it is important to begin asking serious questions about
what, if anything, really differentiates Language poetry from other
poetry. Longenbach, though, does a botched job of exploring this distinction, merely giving lip service to the Language poets while
installing more mainstream poets—such as Louise Gluck, a featured
poet, who "exists in the difficult middle"—into this supposed middle
ground. Unlike Langbaum, who can use his thinking to see the differences in one poet’s work, Longenbach shores up poets and schools,
paradoxically, the very distinctions he seems so keen to be rid of.
This continuation of old, problematic distinctions is not merely
the unfortunate side-effect of using some poorly chosen examples.
Longenbach, it seems, really is against potentially disruptive thinking,
against, for example, the kind of theory that interests the minds of
Language poets. Most noticeably, Longenbach suggests in different
ways that readers should once again simply accept the Romantic ideology. The Romantic ideology, a way of thinking over two centuries
old, is the illusion that the mind can dwell outside of history, that
through poetry one can gain a vantage on contingency. Though this
concept is over twenty years old, and has been thoroughly examined
and critiqued in Jerome McGann’s very good book, The Romantic
Ideology, Longenbach employs the Romantic ideology unselfconsciously. Thus, at the conclusion of a discussion of John Koethe’s "The
Constructor," Longenbach can conclude confidently: "The soul sliding out of chaos. A mood of absolute bewilderment. An angel whispering Come with me. Who would have thought that ‘The Constructor,’
one of the most relentlessly disillusioned poems ever written, could
conclude by finding solace in such beautiful, time-honored nonsense?"
An informed, savvy reader would have expected this; finding solace
from disillusionment in nonsense is one good way of describing the
Romantic ideology. An informed, savvy reader also would be able to
come up with some responses to Longenbach’s rhetorical question
pretty easily: well, perhaps—though he is only mostly (or, as
Longenbach might claim, merely) a poet of epic narrative—Byron, perhaps—though he is merely a theorist—Karl Marx, and definitely—
another theorist—Jerome McGann.
In the chapter "Leaving Things Out," Longenbach obviously
assumes his readership—perhaps filled with an artful, Bishop-like selfforgetfulness—will go along with him unquestioningly. In part of this
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chapter, Longenbach, discussing Wordsworth’s "Tintern Abbey,"
argues against theorists, such as McGann and Marjorie Levinson, who
consider "Tintern Abbey" a key container for and conveyor of
Romantic ideology. In important and challenging works, McGann and
Levinson note that the poem works, that it can attain its spiritual
insight, only by a cover-up, by an avoidance of the real world situation
of the poem, by transforming the site of the poem, the Wye River valley, from a wasted landscape of the industrial revolution and the hangout for its homeless poor that it really was into a much more prettifed,
romanticized landscape. However, according to Longenbach’s one
paragraph on the subject, the problem with these criticisms is that they
don’t respect enough the "complex relationship" language has to what
it represents. Longenbach largely hopes and assumes his readership
simply will agree with his facile representation and assessment of the
long, engaged debates about "Tintern Abbey." But Longenbach
shouldn’t convince; he doesn’t argue in-depth enough to convince anyone with the least doubts about his position. In fact, it is hard to imagine Longenbach himself is convinced by his own arguments, for it is
not only Levinson and McGann who have troubles with this poem;
some great poets—to turn Longenbach’s technique against him—too,
have troubles with this poem, and they express their disagreement—
even though Longenbach states that "we read a poem for its manner
rather than its matter"—in great poems. Wordsworth himself came to
dislike the poem, and he critiques its salvation-through-memory
scheme in his poem, "Peele Castle." Marianne Moore critiques the
overall structure and style of "Tintern Abbey," in her poem, "A
Grave," an argument against the hyper-masculine nature of the thinking in such poems.
Apart from whether or not he is right or wrong about "Tintern
Abbey," Longenbach seems very quick to defend this embattled cultural touchstone. Disappointingly, with the breeziness of his writing,
with its lack of argument, Longenbach does not so much convince
anyone of the value of a touchstone like Wordsworth’s "Tintern
Abbey" but instead assumes that value, basing his argument on it. This
is Longenbach’s deep conservatism, a conservatism he either won’t
admit to or else doesn’t see as he moves discussions from highly technical remarks to highly spiritual speculations using established, mainstream authors to make and validate these moves rather than accepting the responsibility of criticism, of having to come right out and say
that Language poets stink and Wordsworth’s "Tintern Abbey," despite
the theory and the poetry to the contrary, still is powerful and persuasive. Unlike Langbaum, Longenbach won’t introduce a critique of the
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canonical or the mainstream—even though he is equipped to do so.
Longenbach is in possession of a potentially very helpful, insightful, incisive tool for thinking about the worth of poems. In the chapter "Composed Wonder," Longenbach suggests that the poem should,
in the end, feel both structured and surprising, inevitable and unexpected. Longenbach is amazed, for example, by the end of Anthony
Hecht’s poem, "‘It Out-Herods Herod. Pray You, Avoid It’," a poem
that concludes in a way which "[n]othing…prepares us for" and at the
same time seems "inevitable." This standard is hinted at elsewhere in
the book. Longenbach employs the language of structured surprise to
express his admiration for one of the oldest poems in the English language, "Western Wind." About that poem—which reads, "Western
wind, when will thou blow, / The small rain down can rain? / Christ,
if my lover were in my arms / And I in my bed again!"—Longenbach
states, "The expostulation—Christ!—marks the place where the poem
breaks open, releasing an emotion that is both unpredictable and, at
least in retrospect, logical.”
The standard of, the demand for, structured surprise has much
potential. It contributes something new and specific to talk of poetry,
and, for Longenbach, whose views are so often similar to Langbaum’s,
it begins to differentiate his thinking from his predecessor’s which
states that the structure of the dramatic monologue is, essentially, circular. Structured surprise also is radical. It can be used to draw party
lines in new ways. Putting all weight and pressure on the poem, it doesn’t make judgments according to poets or schools. Wet disjunction
might create structured surprise, but so might dry. Ashbery might have
twenty poems that do this, but so might a lesser-known poet—and
such a fact should encourage us to get to know those works of that
lesser-known poet. In fact, what Longenbach says of Bishop’s expectation that art lead to "perfectly useless concentration," that it "makes
the hard work of art seem simultaneously rare and available to everyone," can also be said of structured surprise. Additionally, just as the
poetry of a mind thinking has a greater, symbolic, existential meaning,
so might the poetry of structured surprise; the poem of structured
surprise is a constantly renewed promise that what begins one way
may, with some design and some luck, turn out an enchanting, devastatingly stunning new way; it is further crucial evidence that one is justified in the hope for human-made miracles.
The problems with Longenbach’s use of structured surprise is
that it is both inadequate—it comes into focus only in the book’s final
chapter—and inconsistent. If there are times when one can sense
Longenbach is hinting at this demand, there are also many times when
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he disregards it. Longenbach often simply accepts failure from supposedly great poets. He states, "In any attempt to ‘communicate
impassioned feelings,’ said Wordsworth in a note to one of the lyrical
ballads, we ‘find a consciousness of the inadequateness of our own
powers, or the deficiencies of language.’ That’s what we want to hear."
Of course, plenty of poems "find" inadequacy and deficiency but they
should be considered great not because they’re written by a supposedly great poet but only if by finding inadequacy they earn surprise for
readers. Additionally, while poems may have "the expectation of
meaningfulness," Longenbach allows that that expectation "thrills
because it might be as easily thwarted as fulfilled." The demand of
structured surprise would simply add that if that expectation was simply thwarted or simply fulfilled, then the poem is not likely to be a
good poem, that a good poem demands its expectation be both
thwarted and fulfilled, that its fulfillment be connected and new.
By allowing certain supposedly great poems to be inadequate and
still be great, Longenbach is little different from Charles Bernstein
who states, in his essay "State of the Art,” that he would rather have
failed poems, poems done the supposedly "wrong way," than poems
like those in the mainstream that repeat their predictable findings over
and over. The difference though is that if Bernstein’s adherence to
Language poetry no matter what makes him an avant-garde ideologue,
then Longenbach’s adherence to cultural touchstones and mainstream
successes make him little more than a member of the cultural clerisy.
Because he is unwilling to take up the responsibility of active, engaged,
specific, and even disruptive criticism, because he is unwilling to think
in new ways about different work, Longenbach ends up writing a book
that mostly repeats and, indeed, is based on, familiar mainstream distinctions. The Resistance to Poetry, if it is at all surprising, is mostly surprisingly flawed.
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